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Labor Union Tort Liability
William J. Hotes*O NE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN determination of labor union
tort liability is the extent of federal pre-emption of labor
law matters-does it preclude either state legislation or court
action where interstate commerce is affected? ' In Garner v.
Teamsters Union,2 an employer brought action to enjoin union
behavior which violated state law and which could also constitute
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. The United
States Supreme Court held that, since Congress had provided
for an administrative cease and desist order which could be pre-
ceded by a temporary restraining order, the state remedy con-
flicted with the federal remedy. Therefore, a finding of pre-emp-
tion was required. Similarly, in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations,8
the Supreme Court ruled that the state was foreclosed from
taking jurisdiction where the state board sought to halt conduct
prohibited by both state and federal statutes, even though the
National Labor Relations Board refused to take action because
the dollar volume did not meet the Board's jurisdictional stand-
ards. 4 The decisions in these two cases seem to indicate that the
federal government has preempted the field of tort liability and
the remedies. However, it is also clear that there are areas over
and beyond this in which state law may still apply.5
*B.A. in Government, Denison University; and a Third-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 See: Jenkins, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
31 Rocky Mt. L. R. 315 (1959); Metzger, The Supreme Court, Congress, and
State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 59 Colum. L. R. 6, 269 (1959).
2 346 U. S. 485 (1953).
s 353 U. S. 1 (1957).
4 See also: Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S.
20 (1957); United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62
(1956).
5 See: Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 350 Pa. 3, 109 A. 2d 815 (1954);
Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wash. 2d 453, 275 P. 2d 440
(1954); Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A. 2d 300 (1954); Safeway Stores
v. Retail Clerks Int. Assoc., 41 Cal. 2d 567, 261 P. 2d 721 (1954); Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955); Adams Dairy v. Burke, 293
S. W. 2d 281 (Mo., 1956); MacDonald v. Feldman, 393 Pa. 274, 142 A. 2d 1(1958); Perko v. Local No. 207 of Int'l. Assoc. of Bridge, Structural and
Ornamental Iron Workers Union et al., 168 Ohio St. 161, 151 N. E. 2d 742(1958); Baumgartner's Electrical Construction Co. v. DeVries, et al., 91
N. W. 2d 663 (So. Dak., 1958); Lavery's Main St. Grill, Inc. v. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees-Bartenders Union Local 288 et al., 146 Conn. 93,
147 A. 2d 902 (1959); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 233 F. 2d
62 (9th Cir. 1956), affd. 77 S. Ct. 699, 353 U. S. 138 (1956); Grunwald-Marx,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amer-
ica, 343 P. 2d 23 (Cal., 1959).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
LABOR UNION TORTS
In United Construction Workers v. Laburnam Construction
Corporation," the Supreme Court permitted an employer to re-
cover substantial compensatory and punitive damages in a tort
action in a state court because it did not find a conflict of remedies
sufficient to deprive the state court of jurisdiction. In that case,
the employer's construction contracts had been canceled when
a stranger union tried through secondary pressure, mass picket-
ing, and threats of violence, to force employees who were mem-
bers of recognized unions to join its ranks. The only federal
remedy available to the employer was a cease and desist order
which would have provided no real relief. The Court considered
the unfair labor practice as merely incidental to the employer's
claim and allowed the state remedy to stand.
The ruling in Laburnam was extended, clarified, and applied
in UAW-CIO v. Russell.7 In this case, an employee was kept
from working for five weeks (at a loss of earnings of $100 per
week) by the mass picketing and threats of violence of a striking
union. The union's conduct was tortious under Alabama law and
may have been an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley
Act. Instead of bringing an unfair labor practice before the
N. L. R. B., which might have resulted in an award of full back
pay only, Russell chose to bring a tort action in the state courtss
for lost wages and punitive damages. He was awarded a judg-
ment of $10,000. The Supreme Court allowed the state decision
to stand, pointing out that a back pay award, although incidentally
compensatory, is made to effectuate the policies of the Act, there-
by vindicating public rather than private rights. In the absence
of a clear indication to the contrary, the Court refused to find
an intent by Congress to ban a fully compensatory tort action
in the state court merely because of the existence of N. L. R. B.
jurisdiction. Thus, by delineating public and private rights, the
Court theoretically avoided conflicting federal-state remedies
which might destroy uniform federal regulations. Following this
line of reasoning, it can be concluded that a denial by the
N. L. R. B. of an award of back pay to vindicate a public right
is consistent with a recovery of back pay plus punitive damages
in a state court to vindicate a private right.9
6 347 U. S. 656 (1954).
7 356 U. S. 635 (1958). See also the closely related case of International
Assoc. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617 (1958), decided by the U. S.
Supreme Court on the same day.
8 Russell v. UAW-CIO, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384 (1953); UAW-CIO v.
Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956).
9 UAW-CIO v. Russell, supra, n. 7, at 645.
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In the recent case of San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,10 the employer brought action against unions for injunc-
tion to restrain picketing and for damages. The Superior Court
of San Diego County rendered judgment for the employer, and
the unions appealed. The California Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment insofar as it granted an injunction and re-
manded the case. The California Supreme Court then entered
judgment awarding damages and the unions brought certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court held that, where picketing
by unions was arguably within the compass of the section of the
National Labor Relations Act dealing with the right of employees
as to organization, collective bargaining, etc., or the section deal-
ing with unfair labor practices, the California court had no juris-
diction to award employer damages for injuries caused by picket-
ing on the ground that picketing constituted a tort under state
law, although the National Labor Relations Board had declined
to exercise its jurisdiction, presumably because the amount of
interstate commerce involved did not meet the Board's monetary
standards for taking jurisdiction. The court distinguished the
Garmon case from the Laburnam case and the Russell case by
saying that state jurisdiction prevailed in those cases because
the compelling state interest in the maintenance of domestic
peace was not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed
Congressional direction. The court found no such compelling
state interest in the Garmon case where the picketing was peace-
ful.
The Garmon decision has had an impact upon the decisions
of state courts. An example is Angell v. Wood, Wire, and Metal
Lathers International Union,1 where the court held that states
must withhold access to their courts until the National Labor
Relations Board has determined that the conduct is or is not un-
fair labor practice and that, where the Board declines to exercise
10 San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020, Build-
ing Material and Dump Drivers, Local 36 v. Garmon, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.
2d 1, revd. and remd. 353 U. S. 26, 77 S. Ct. 607, 1 L. Ed. 2d 618; 49 Cal. 2d
595, 320 P. 2d 473 on remand, revd. 359 U. S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d
775 (1959).
11 324 S. W. 2d 83 (Tex., 1959). See also: Retail Clerks' Union, Local 1364
v. Superior Court, 339 P. 2d 839 (Calif., 1959); Chavez v. Sargent, 339 P. 2d
801 (Calif., 1959); United Brick and Tile Division of American-Marietta Co.
v. Wilkinson, 325 S. W. 2d 50 (Mo., 1959); Willard v. Huffman, 109 S. E.
2d 233 (N. Car., 1959); Hawthorne-Sommerfield, Inc. v. Hellman, 187 N. Y. S.
2d 387 (1959); Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Fernandez, 185 N. Y. S. 2d 280
(1959).
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its jurisdiction, the states are entirely deprived of power to
afford any relief.
All of this has left labor law in a state of turmoil. The com-
prehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress has
created difficult problems of federal-state regulations. Many of
the problems could not have been foreseen by Congress; others
were only vaguely defined. It has been necessary for judicial
process to fill in many of the details in a complex legislative pro-
gram. It may be that the recent Act of Congress, the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act,12 signed September 14,
1959, will clarify the matter. Section 701 of the Act provides
that the jurisdiction which the National Labor Relations Board
had on August 1, 1959, continues and that nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, shall be deemed to bar the
courts of any state from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over
labor disputes over which the Board declines to assert jurisdic-
tion.
Agency Relationship
In determining who are the agents of the unions and the
responsibility of these unions for the behavior of their agents,
there are many complex considerations. For one thing, unions
are loose organizations consisting of committees within local,
district, national, and international organizations. Often the
question of the respective liability of these divisions must be de-
cided. In addition, the responsibility of the union for strikes in
violation of agreement, for the conduct of committeemen and
stewards who handle grievances, and for activities of individual
members must be determined. The difficulties are aggravated by
the fact that union members, acting voluntarily, may still be
acting for the union, or unions could encourage various activi-
ties and claim that the parties involved were not authorized.
Under common law, the judicial authorities recognized that
unions that function in their own capacity do so as principals
and are held liable for their agents' behavior. Because they have
created the agency relationship, the unions are held liable for the
illegal behavior of the persons who have real or apparent au-
thority to act for the unions, as long as the agents are functioning
within the scope of the authority. Activity by an agent which is
outside of or beyond the scope of his real or apparent authority
12 7 U. S. C. § 701 (Public Law 86-257).
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cannot be attributed to the union unless the union thereafter
ratifies.
To ascertain who are agents of the union, the N. L. R. B.
is regulated by § 2 (13) of the Taft-Hartley Act: 13
In determining whether any person is acting as an 'agent'
of another person so as to make such other person re-
sponsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling.
In the case of International Longshoremen's and Warehouse-
men's Union (CIO) et al. v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 14 where a
shipper brought action against the international union, the local
union, and individuals to recover damages for a secondary boy-
cott, the court interpreted this same provision of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act 15 as follows: "We think the section was
intended to cover the acts of officers of the union who deal with
employers or the public. That is, if a union permits an officer or
other representative to get into a position where he can and
does cause trouble proscribed by the act then the union is re-
sponsible." 16 In other words, agency has taken on a meaning
under the Taft-Hartley Act that includes ostensible authority.
Unions as Entities
For purposes of litigation, a union may be viewed either as
an aggregate of individuals or as an entity apart from its mem-
bers. At common law, a union is an aggregation, not an entity
capable of appearing as an interested party in a law suit. In a
New York case, the court held that the Taft-Hartley Act is not
applicable to common law tort actions in the state courts and said:
A voluntary unincorporated association is neither a partner-
ship nor a corporation. It has no independent existence as
an artificial person separate and apart from its members and
the acts of individual members, even though they be officers
of a voluntary organization, do not and cannot bind the other
members without their consent or unless with full knowl-
edge of the facts they ratify and adopt same as their own
acts thereafter. . . (T) he liability which may be imposed in
any action in which the association's officers are named in
13 49 Stat. 450 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 152 (13) (1952).
14 226 F. 2d 875 (9th Cir., 1955).
15 § 301(e), Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 157, 29 U. S.
C. A. § 185(e).
16 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (CIO) et al.
v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra, n. 14, at 880.
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their representative capacities, as is the case herein, is still
that of the members as individuals. 7
The difficulty presented of attempting to join all members in
an action can insulate a union from suit or deny it access to the
courts.'8
Although many states continue to regard unions as aggregates
of individuals, the problem of multiple joinder has been solved
by the class action which is a form of suit allowing a few in-
dividuals to litigate on behalf of all union members.19 In Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. A., 20 the court held that, where
labor unions may not be sued as separate entities, class suit
against representative members is proper.
Other jurisdictions have enabled unions and other unin-
corporated associations to sue or be sued as entities, thereby
abandoning the aggregate concept. For example, under Penn-
sylvania law, class actions are not permitted against unincor-
porated associations, and an action against an unincorporated
labor union must either name the union entity as a party de-
fendant or name one of its officers as a trustee ad litem.21 Gen-
erally, the change enabling unions to sue or be sued as entities
has been accomplished by statute.2 2 In some cases, unions may
17 Coleman v. Pokodner, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 161, 164 (1957). See also: Karges
Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421, 423-424, 75 N. E.
877, 878 (1905); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589-590, 78 N. E. 753, 760-
761 (1906); Tyler v. Boot and Shoe Workers, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509
(1933).
18 See: Collins v. Barry, 11 Ill. App. 2d 119, 136 N. E. 2d 597 (1956); Milam
v. Settle, 127 W. Va. 271, 32 S. E. 2d 269 (1944); Kaplan, Suits against Un-
incorporated Associations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53
Mich. L. Rev. 945, 946 (1955). An abortive attempt to require mandatory
incorporation of labor unions, in Colorado in 1943, is discussed in Oleck,
Non-Profit Corporations & Assns., 313 (1956).
19 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 37-1002, -1007 (1936) (equity); O'Jay Spread Co. v.
Hicks, 185 Ga. 507, 195 S. E. 564 (1938); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 23 (1956);
O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill. App. 2d 173, 144 N. E. 2d 446 (1957); Ind. Stat.
Ann. § 2-220 (1946); Nelson v. Haley, 232 Ind. 314, 111 N. E. 2d 812 (1953);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 507.070 (1952); Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S. W. 2d 413 (Mo.,
1957); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir., 1948);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F. 2d 403 (4th Cir.,
1945); Nissen v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N. W.
858 (1941); Note, 67 Harv. L. R. 1059 (1954).
20 Supra, n. 5.
21 Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 149
F. Supp. 695 (D. C. E. D., Pa., 1957).
22 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-76 (1958); Del. Code Ann. title 10, § 3904 (1953);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-213 (1948); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 64-1 (1952).
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appear as entities only if they are defendants.23 In Ohio, the
courts have interpreted the Ohio provision for class actions 24 as
permitting labor unions to be sued as entities,25 and, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, court decisions have given unions the capacity
to litigate as entities.26
A union is generally unable to sue or be sued as an entity in
West Virginia, and a class action may not be brought on behalf
of its members, although the union's existence is recognized for
some purposes.
2 7
Section 301 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act clearly states that
unions are bound by the behavior of their agents. In the courts
of the United States, a union can be sued or it can sue both as an
entity and in behalf of the members or employees it represents.
This section of the law provides that a money judgment against
a labor organization in a District Court can be enforced only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets-not
against any individual member or his assets.28 By this section, a
worker is protected against the reasoning in Loewe v. Lawlor29 in
which it was held that mere membership in a union made one
responsible for the activities of the organization.
Establishing Agency
The N. L. R. B. has established several controlling basic
rules of agency to be applied in determining the responsibility of
a union for unfair labor practices. The first rule is that the com-
plainant must prove the existence of the agency relationship and
the nature and extent of the agent's authority. Secondly, the
agent and the principal each must have voluntarily agreed that
the agent can legally act for the principal. The third rule is that
the union may be held liable for the acts of the agent if he is
functioning within the scope of his apparent authority. There-
fore, under the ordinary principles of agency, a union may be
held liable for its agent's behavior if the act performed is actually
23 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 388 (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-2927
(1947); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 510:13 (1955).
24 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.21 (Page, 1954).
25 Williams v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 81 F. Supp. 150 (D. C.
N. D., Ohio, 1948).
26 Busby v. Electric Util. Employees Union, 147 F. 2d 865 (D. C. Cir., 1945).
27 Marion v. Chandler, 139 W. Va. 596, 81 S. E. 2d 89 (1954).
28 See, e.g., Morgan Drive Away v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 166 F. Supp. 885 (D. C. S. D., Ind., 1958).
29 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
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authorized by the union, if it is ratified by the union after it has
occurred, or even if the act is performed without the consent of
the union or is strictly forbidden by the organization, if the
agent is operating within the scope of his employment. 30
In applying these common law rules of agency to determine
union liability for unfair practices, the N. L. R. B. has ruled that
mere advocacy of unionism by rank and file employees is not
sufficient to make them agents of the union.3 1
A. Apparent Authority
In terms of these rules of agency, a union is held responsible
for the acts of its officers even though their activities are not
authorized by the union. It is also held responsible if the
officers act without the consent of the parent organization if
they are properly elected to their positions and are delegated cer-
tain functions by the union constitution and the union bylaws.
In United Mine Workers et at. v. Patton et aL.,3 2 both the inter-
national union and the district union were held responsible for
the acts done by field representatives in organizational activi-
ties.
It is true that there is no evidence of any resolution of either
the United Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratify-
ing the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes
were called by the Field Representative of the United Mine
Workers, who was employed by District 28, and that he was
engaged in the organization work that was being carried on
by the international union through District 28, which was a
mere division of the international union. Members of the
union are members of local and district unions as well as
the international; and of the $4 monthly dues paid by them,
$2 goes to the international union, $1 to the local union and
$1 to the district organization. It is clear that in carrying
on organization work the field representative is engaged in
both the international union and the district and that both
are responsible for acts done by him within the scope and
course of his employment.3"
30 United Furniture Workers, CIO, 84 NLRB 563 (1949) (Colonial Hard-
wood Flooring Co.).
31 Poinsett Lumber and Mfg. Co., 107 NLRB 234 (1953). See also: Inter-
national Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (CIO) et al. v.
Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra, n. 14.
32 211 F. 2d 742 (4th Cir., 1954).
33 Ibid., at 746. See also United Mine Workers of America v. Meadow
Creek Coal Co., 263 F. 2d 52 (6th Cir., 1959); Hindman v. First National
(Continued on next page)
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In Electrical Workers Union (Cory Corporation) 34 both the
local and international union who called a strike were held for
various acts of restraint committed by their agents. That the un-
lawful behavior performed by the agents was specifically for-
bidden by the union was held irrelevant, the controlling factor
being that the agents were functioning within the scope of their
apparent authority. Unions have also been held responsible for
the conduct of appointed trustees and for members who are not
appointed stewards, but perform the nominal duties of the office.35
Striking employees are considered agents of the union when
they picket to bring about a secondary boycott if they are told
by the union officials to follow the employer's trucks and if the
officials participate in the picketing.3G The international union
that controls directly the operations and policies of the local
unions under its guidance is responsible for a secondary boycott
conducted by these locals.37 It has also been held that the union
violated the statute through the activities of its agents who at-
tempted to persuade customers not to buy the products of an
employer who was engaged in a strike.38
Organizations are liable for any unlawful acts of pickets if
the officers of the unions are present when the unlawful be-
havior takes place,39 if the business agent controls and guide the
actions of the pickets, 40 or if the unions authorize the picketing
in any way.41
(Continued from preceding page)
Bank of Louisville, 112 F. 931 (6th Cir., 1902); Oman v. U. S., 179 F. 2d 738(10th Cir., 1949); U. S. v. Waters, 194 F. 2d 866 (7th Cir., 1952); Jefferson
Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 27 S. E. 2d 198 (1943).
34 84 NLRB 972. See also: United Mine Workers, 106 NLRB 903 (1953)
(Tungsten Mining Corp.).
35 Local 182, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 111 NLRB 952 (1955)(Lane Construction Company); Local 391, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL, 110 NLRB 748 (1954) (Thurston Motor Lines, Inc.).
36 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 116 NLRB No. 65 (1956)
(Ready Mixed Concrete Co.).
37 International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (CIO) et al.
v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., supra, n. 14; International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 107 NLRB 161 (1953) (Osceola Foods, Inc.).
38 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 115 NLRB No. 251 (1956)
(Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis).
39 United Mine Workers, 95 NLRB 546 (1951) (B. H. Swaney, Inc.).
40 Carpenters and Painters, AFL, 95 NLRB 969 (1951) (Fairmount Con-
struction Co.).
41 Baumgartner's Electric Construction Co. v. DeVries, et al., supra, n. 5;
Ballas Egg Products Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men of North America, A. F. L.-C. 1. 0., Local 346, 160 N. E. 2d 164 (Ohio,
1959).
May, 1960
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
LABOR UNION TORTS
In determining the responsibility of the union for assaults
on others by union members, it has been established that the
union is liable for such acts, even if unauthorized, if an officer of
the union is present,42 or if the person guilty of the assaults is
functioning within the scope of his apparent authority or em-
ployment at the time.43 A union is not responsible for an as-
sault upon other employees by pickets if these pickets are not
officers, if no responsible union officer knew of the activities, and
if the assault did not occur on the picket line."4 In NLRB v. Dal-
las General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 725,
AFL-CIO,45 a picketing employee, Jones, told the union steward,
Neely, that he was thinking of going back to work. Neely at-
tempted to dissuade him. Overhearing the conversation were
three other striking employees who told Jones that they would
beat him up if he did go back to work. Neely kept silent and
did not repudiate the threats. The N. L. R. B. held that the union,
through Neely's failure to repudiate the threats, was guilty of
coercive conduct and ordered the union to cease and desist from
threatening employees with violence if they abandon any strike
called by the union or in like manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees. The court did not sustain the Board's order in this
respect, holding that the authority of a union steward to adopt,
on behalf of the union, threats made by union members who are
not officers, will not be presumed. There was no proof of au-
thorization or ratification.
B. Guilt by Association
Both the courts and the legislatures have endeavored to pro-
tect the individual worker from being held liable for the illegal
acts of others. In 1908, the United States Supreme Court held
that mere membership in a union made the worker responsible
for the acts of his agent performed in the due course of their
employment.46 Also, mere membership made one responsible for
42 Roadway Express Inc., 108 NLRB 874 (1954); Local 914, United Electri-
cal Workers, 106 NLRB 1372 (1953).
43 NLRB v. Local 55, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL, 205 F. 2d
515 (10th Cir., 1953); Local 135, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL, 112 NLRB 17 (1955) (Midwest Transfer Co.).
44 National Union of Marine Cooks, CIO, 87 NLRB 54 (1949) (Irwin-Lyons
Lumber Co.).
45 264 F. 2d 642 (5th Cir., 1959).
46 Loewe v. Lawlor, supra, n. 29.
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damages to the extent of his personal possessions, even if he was
unaware of the illegal boycott sanctioned by the union. Section
301 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act relieved the individual union
member of such liability.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act,47 passed in 1932, established the
principle that guilt is personal. Section 648 of the act makes it
clear that individuals can only be held liable for the illegal acts
of others or their associates if they ratify, sanction, or participate
in the unlawful behavior. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America v. United States,49 the Supreme Court, in
applying §6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in criminal prosecution
for alleged conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
said:
We need not determine whether Sec. 6 should be called a
rule of evidence or one that changes the substantive law of
agency. We hold that its purpose and effect was to relieve
organizations, whether of labor or capital, and members of
those organizations from liability for damages or imputation
of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some in-
dividual officers or members of the organization without
clear proof that the organization or member, charged with
responsibility for the offense, actually participated, gave
prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowl-
edge of their perpetration.5"
However, in 1953, the N. L. R. B. held that mere member-
ship in a union conducting a strike or work stoppage in viola-
tion of the contract is adequate justification for discharge. It was
not considered significant that the workers discharged were sick
or excused from work and did not participate in the unlawful
strike. The Board based its reasoning upon the fact that the em-
ployees had received letters from the employer that all par-
ticipants in the unlawful strike would be discharged, but they
47 47 Stat. 70, (1932), 29 U. S. C. §101 (1952).
48 47 Stat. 71, (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 106 (1952). "No officer or member of any
association or organization, and no association or organization participating
or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any
court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, mem-
bers, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or ac-
tual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof."
49 330 U. S. 395 (1947).
50 Ibid., at 403. See also: United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259
U. S. 344 (1921); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S.
295 (1924); Bianchi v. U. S., 219 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir., 1955); Callanan v. U. S.,
223 F. 2d 171 (8th Cir., 1955).
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made no effort to disassociate themselves from the unlawful con-
duct of the union.51
In a later case52 the Board emphasized and justified guilt by
association. In this case, the union involved called an unfair
labor practice strike against management. Violence in the form
of intimidation and property damage was committed by some
union members and by some outside sympathizers. Reinstate-
ment was denied the strikers who were not guilty of committing
any of the violence or of condoning or authorizing it, because they
continued to picket peacefully and did not disavow the unlawful
behavior. The Board contended that the fact that they did con-
tinue to picket, even though peacefully, and that they failed to
condemn the violence or disavow and dissociate themselves from
the strike and those guilty of the unlawful behavior was equiva-
lent to approval or ratification of the violence. Under conditions
existing in this strike, the Board felt that the complete denial
of reinstatement and back pay without considering individual
fault would discourage violence in later labor disputes.
The following year the N. L. R. B. did not apply the doctrine
of guilt by association in Bowman Transportation, Inc.53 In this
case, the Board ruled that violence during a strike would not
disqualify a picketing employee for reinstatement without suf-
ficient evidence that he participated in or sanctioned the illegal
incidents that occurred. Furthermore, the Board ruled that mere
membership in a union council does not establish an agency re-
lationship and that members of a council who did not participate
in or ratify an unlawful boycott could not be held for the illegal
acts of others because of council membership.54
Generally, the courts have not accepted the doctrine of guilt
by association. The court, in NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Company,55
held that striking employees cannot be discharged or denied re-
instatement in terms of the National Labor Relations Act because
they are members of a union that began and continued an un-
lawful strike; only those who actually participate in the illegal
activity can be discharged or denied reinstatement. It has also
been held that unauthorized acts of violence performed by in-
dividual strikers cannot be charged to other union strikers who
51 Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 NLRB 1171 (1953).
52 BVD Company, 110 NLRB 1412 (1954).
53 112 NLRB 387 (1955).
54 Pasco-Kennewick Building Trades Council, 111 NLRB 1255 (1955).
55 133 F. 2d 721 (6th Cir., 1943).
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do not participate in the violence.56 Workers who do not par-
ticipate in the violence need not take steps to disassociate them-
selves from the illegal behavior.57 In NLRB v. Marshall Car
Wheel and Foundry Co.,58 it was held that individual responsi-
bility is controlling in determining who is entitled to reinstate-
ment in the case of illegal activities. In a 1958 case,59 the court
ruled that the protection provided by § 6 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act does not extend to individuals who engage in an il-
legal strike in which a labor organization of which they are mem-
bers is not interested. 60
Conclusion
In conclusion it may be said that one of the major problems
involved in the determination of tort liability of labor unions is
that of federal pre-emption. The recent expression by Congress of
its intent as to the extent of federal jurisdiction in the labor re-
lations field may avoid much of the existing confusion and
duplication.
In the federal courts, a union may be sued or may sue both
as an entity and for members or employees it represents. Many
states continue to regard unions as aggregates of individuals, but
in most of these states the problem of multiple joinder has been
solved by the class action.
As for the agency relationship between a union and its mem-
bers, it is well settled that unions can be held liable for the il-
legal behavior of those who have real or apparent authority to
act for the unions, with the proviso that the agents are function-
ing within the scope of their authority. Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, it is not necessary in determining union liability to prove
that the specific acts performed by the union's agent were ac-
tually authorized or subsequently ratified by the union, but the
agent must be operating within the scope of his employment.
Although the N. L. R. B. has upon occasion followed the
doctrine of guilt by association, the courts generally have not
accepted this concept. In most instances, unauthorized acts of
violence performed by individual strikers cannot be imputed to
other union strikers who do not participate in violence.
56 NLRB v. Deena Artware Inc., 198 F. 2d 645 (6th Cir., 1952), cert. denied,
345 U. S. 906 (1953).
57 NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F. 2d 48 (6th Cir., 1954).
58 218 F. 2d 409 (5th Cir., 1955).
59 Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Brown, 225 F. 2d 149 (5th Cir.,
1958).
60 Ibid., at 157.
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